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Abstract
We study the effect of differential taxation of personal and corporate
tax bases on income shifting for 24 European countries over the pe-
riod 2000-2016. The data cover 48 sectors at the 2-digit industry level.
Our results provide evidence of significant income shifting via legal
form choice. Specifically, a 1%-point increase in the tax differential
between personal and corporate income tax rates results in a 0.8%
increase in the corporate share of active firms and a 0.3% increase in
the corporate share of employment. Moreover, we find that personal
income tax revenues paid by self-employed decrease by about 0.3%.
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1 Introduction
Tax competition and tax avoidance remain controversial topics in Europe, as
illustrated by the European Commission (2018a) with the recent debate on
aggressive tax planning. The decline in the tax burden of corporations over
the past decades is at the core of the issue, especially in relation to personal
tax rates.1 Figure 1 plots the evolution over time of the top statutory tax
rates on personal and corporate income in Europe and their difference. It
shows that the tax differential between the two has been steeply increasing
in the 2000s, and despite a slowdown in recent years, it still displays a clear
upward trend.
An increasing differential between personal and corporate income tax rates
creates an incentive for entrepreneurs to choose the least taxed organizational
form. This encourages income shifting across the personal and corporate
income tax bases. This expands the corporate tax base at the expense of the
personal income tax base, and could help explain the robustness of corporate
tax revenues to declining corporate tax rates. If large enough, the effect
could counteract the fall in corporate tax revenue that would be expected
from decreasing corporate tax rates.2 However, when average personal tax
rates exceed corporate tax rates, the gains in corporate income tax revenues
are offset by losses in personal income tax revenues.
In this paper we assess the magnitude of this effect by estimating the tax
elasticity on income shifting. In the past various papers have measured this
elasticity with various outcomes on its magnitude. We use a larger data
set covering nearly all European countries. We also estimate the impact
1Other factors affecting the corporate tax burden are the increase in the corporate
share of the financial sector, the decline of non-corporate sectors, the implementation of
tax broadening policies, higher implicit corporate tax rates related to less generous offset
rules and greater profitability of the economy. See Nicodème (2007) and Keen and Konrad
(2013).
2In Europe, corporate tax revenues measured as percentage of total taxes are on a
raising path whereas revenues from the personal income tax are declining, as shown by
figure A1 in the appendix. Income shifting is acknowledged as one of the factors that can
explain diverging trends in corporate tax rates and revenues, see Sørensen (2007).
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Figure 1: Average top statutory income tax rates in Europe, percentage
Source: European Commission and own calculations. Notes: The figure plots the aver-
age top statutory corporate and personal income rates (including surcharges, expressed
in percentage) for 27 European Union countries plus the United Kingdom, Norway and
Iceland. The dotted line plots the difference between the two series.
on incorporation on the personal income tax base, using European data on
the tax revenues of self-employed. Our data include 24 countries over 2000–
2016, covering 48 2-digits industry level sectors that can be aggregated into
12 1-digit level sectors. Our estimates imply that a reduction in the tax
differential leads to an increase in the corporate tax base. Specifically, a 1%-
point increase in the tax differential between personal and corporate income
tax rates results in a 0.3-0.8% increase in the corporate share of firms and
a 0.2-0.3% increase in the corporate share of employment. The outcomes
depend on whether we measure corporate shares in terms of active or new
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firms. This in turn corresponds to elasticities in the range of 0.03-0.15. In
addition, we assess the impact of an increase in the corporate share in the
economy on the tax base. Our estimates suggest that the projected 0.8%
increase in the corporate share of active firms, associated with a 1%-point
increase in the tax differential, results in approximately 0.3% decrease in the
personal income tax revenues paid by the self-employed. Results are robust
to alternative specifications.
When deciding over organizational form, entrepreneurs weight potential tax
and non-tax costs and benefits of one legal form against the other. In the
United States, corporate tax rates exceed personal tax rates, and can there-
fore discourage companies that want to incorporate from doing so.3 In Eu-
rope, corporate tax rates are usually lower than personal tax rates. Thus,
entrepreneurs may have an incentive to incorporate to be able to reclassify
income from personal to corporate tax bases.4
De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) consider 17 European countries over 1997-
2003 and find an elasticity of the corporate share in the range of 0.2-0.5
for a 1% increase in tax differential. The size of the impact depends on
whether the corporate share is measured in terms of new or existing number
of firms or employees in corporate firms. These estimates are in line with
what found for the United States by Liu (2014) but larger than those of
Goolsbee (2004), who reports elasticities in the order of 0.1-0.15.5 Consid-
ering comparable country specific evidence, Tazhitdinova (2016) reports an
elasticity of the hazard rate of incorporation with respect to tax savings of
0.2 for the United Kingdom. Finally, Egger et al. (2009) estimate that a 1%-
3As pointed out by as pointed out by Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994), Mackie-Mason
and Gordon (1997), Gordon and Slemrod (1998), Goolsbee (1998, 2004) , Liu (2014) and
Chen et al. (2018). Until the tax reform of the Trump administration in 2018, the United
States displayed corporate rates exceeding personal income tax rates.
4As stressed by De Mooij and Nicodème (2008), Egger et al. (2009), Thoresen and
Alstadsæter (2010), Alstadsæter and Wangen (2010), Alstadsæter and Jacob (2013), Ed-
mark and Gordon (2013) and Tazhitdinova (2016). Most studies focus on Scandinavian
countries or the United Kingdom (evidence is hard to generalize to Europe as a whole).
5See also table A1 in the appendix for a comparison of existing estimates.
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point increase in the effective shareholder corporate tax burden in Europe
reduces the probability to incorporate by about 0.1%-points on average.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, to our knowledge we
are the first to directly evaluate the impact of larger corporate share in the
economy on personal income taxes paid by the self-employed. De Mooij and
Nicodème (2008) calculate the impact of income shifting on the corporate tax
base indirectly and find that income shifting can account for approximately
12 to 21% of corporate tax revenues. More recently, Devereux et al. (2014)
estimate a 0.05-0.08 elasticity of the share of income taken as profit with
respect to the difference between the personal and corporate tax rates for the
United Kingdom. In addition, we provide updated estimates of the impact
of the tax differential on corporate shares in the economy in Europe. Our
results cover a larger number of countries as well as a longer time span
relative to existing estimates and include several robustness checks that were
not performed by previous literature.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical back-
ground and the resulting empirical methodology. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 presents the results for income shifting and section 5 those
for the tax base effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
Our empirical methodology rests upon a stylized theoretical framework pro-
vided by Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997) and Liu (2014).6 These models
depict firms choice over the legal form as determined by a comparison of the
net tax cost from incorporation to its net non-tax (firm specific) costs and
benefit. As stressed by De Mooij and Nicodème (2008), tax costs of incorpo-
ration in Europe often are tax gains. Non-tax benefits of incorporation are
6A similar setup is also adopted by Goolsbee (1998, 2004). Egger et al. (2009), Kotlikoff
and Miao (2010) and Chen et al. (2018) later developed more complex and detailed models.
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limited liability and improved access to capital whereas non-tax costs consist
of minimum capital requirements and legal and reporting obligations.7
Formally, non-corporate entrepreneurs earn gross income Ip, which is taxed
under the personal income tax rate τ p. Incorporated entrepreneurs earn gross
income Ic, taxed at the corporate rate τ c. Profit maximizing entrepreneurs
will incorporate whenever net profit from incorporation exceeds net profit
derived from the non-corporate form. That is, given that:
(1− τ c)Ic > (1− τ p)Ip (1)
Where gross corporate income is a function of the gross personal income
plus a factor δ representing the non-tax costs of incorporation, such that
Ic = Ip(1 + δ). δ has no sign restrictions and includes factors such as limited
liability, access to capital, minimum capital requirements and compliance
and reporting costs related to incorporation. Firms will optimally choose to
incorporate when:




That is, incorporation decisions will be based on the relative taxation of
corporate and personal income as well as the net non-tax costs from incorpo-
ration.8 Thus, an empirical model based on this theoretical framework can
be formalized as follows:9
CSjit = β0 + β1(τ
p
it − τ cit) + β2Xit + λt + γj + εjit (3)
7Limited liability protects the entrepreneur’s personal assets (i.e. only capital invested
in the firm can be lost). Public trading of shares of corporations may facilitate attracting
capital. See Egger et al. (2009) for a theoretical framework. Incorporation may be more
costly for entrepreneurs who engage in tax evasion, as it may be relatively easier to evade
taxes under sole proprietor legal form. Due to measurement problems, we disregard tax
evasion and focus on tax avoidance.
8The optimal decision on incorporation depends on the relative weight of corporate and
personal taxes under the assumption that equity taxes are zero.
9Note that the latter can be derived by log-linearizing equation 2 and keeping in mind
that log(1 + t) ≈ t for small enough t.
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Where CSjit is the corporate share of business in sector j in country i at
time t, measured both in terms of number of firms and persons employed, for
active and new firms. τ pit and τ cit represent the personal and the corporate top
statutory income tax rates, respectively. Xit is a vector of control variables,
λt represents time fixed effects, γj industry specific effects and εit is a mean
zero error term. The main coefficient of interest is β1, which should enter
the equation with a positive sign. That is, a higher personal income tax
rate relative to the corporate income tax rate is likely to result in firms’
incorporation and increase the corporate share of firms.
In contrast to De Mooij and Nicodème (2008), we include control variables
Xit in our baseline specification. Specifically, we use an indicator for the ease
of starting a (corporate) business to account for non-tax costs and benefits of
incorporation. In addition, we include real GDP growth, which accounts for
cyclical economic factors and thus for changes in the distribution of taxable
income.10 More generally, real GDP growth proxies firm’s profitability. At
higher growth rates entrepreneurs may fall within higher personal and cor-
porate tax brackets. When τp > τc, and given the greater progressivity of
personal tax rates, higher GDP growth may imply that the tax differential
matters more.
Next, we investigate whether the share of corporate firms in the economy
has a negative impact on the personal income tax base by estimating the
following equation:
PERSit = α0 + α1CSitj + α2Xit + λt + γj + εit (4)
PERSit is the share of personal taxes paid by the self-employed in total
taxes and CSitj is the corporate share of business in the economy, measured
in terms of number of active firms. The coefficient of interest α1 should enter
10See also the data section for more details on the variables used. De Mooij and
Nicodème (2008) include these controls in their robustness section but they are constrained
by data availability for the ease of doing business, as the latter was only observed for one
year of their sample.
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the equation with a negative sign. That is, an increase in the corporate share
of businesses in the economy is expected to reduce the personal income tax
base. This would provide additional direct evidence for income shifting across
tax bases. εit is a mean zero error and remaining variables are as discussed
above.
Equations 3 and 4 are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and in-
cluding time and industry fixed effects. Country fixed effects are not included
as we add instead dummies accounting for data breaks in several countries.11
These are expected to account for some of the country specific variation,
as is also the case for the inclusion of real GDP growth and of the ease of
doing business (EDB) indicator, which is relatively stable over time. Sec-
tion 5 tests the robustness of the results by using an instrumental variable
(IV) approach to account for the endogeneity problem that could arise from
estimating equation 3 with OLS.
3 Data
Our sample consists of 24 European countries observed over the period 2000–
2016. Summary statistics for the main variables of interest are reported in
table 1. Table A2 in the appendix provides definitions and sources.
The dependent variable is the corporate share of economic activity, measured
by the number of firms or by persons employed in the population of new or
existing (active) firms. Eurostat’s Business Demography database provides
information on the number of (persons employed in) active and new firms
for (i) sole proprietors, subject to personal income tax rates, (ii) private or
publicly quoted joint stock companies with limited liability, subject to the
corporate tax rate, and (iii) partnerships. The latter can be both person-
ally owned limited and unlimited liability firms, and therefore can be taxed
under both personal and corporate tax rates. The corporate share of firms
11See data section and table A4 for more details on the breaks in the data series.
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(employment) in the economy is obtained by dividing the number of (em-
ployed persons in) limited liability firms by the sum of (employed persons
in) limited liability and sole proprietorship firms, multiplied by 100. This is
done for both new and existing firms, here we follow De Mooij and Nicodème
(2008). Table A3 in the appendix reports country specific corporate share
averages.12
Table 1: Summary statistics of the main variables
1-digit 2-digits
mean sd mean sd
Corporate share, number of active firms 42.96 24.59 50.18 25.82
Corporate share, number of new firms 37.79 25.15 43.23 26.65
Corporate share, employed persons in active firms 75.69 20.77 81.73 19.62
Corporate share, employed persons in new firms 48.33 26.11 55.32 27.24
Statutory tax rate on personal income 41.78 11.75 42.87 11.08
Statutory tax rate on corporate income 22.69 6.690 23.27 6.464
Tax differential 19.09 10.39 19.60 9.917
Annual real GDP growth 2.087 3.495 2.003 3.329
Economic freedom 69.33 5.235 69.07 5.048
Ease of starting a business 84.42 9.233 84.45 9.446
KOF globalization index 79.53 7.127 79.63 7.367
Observations 3,542 10,607
Self-employed tax revenues, % corporate taxes 20.23 12.90 20.93 13.17
Self-employed tax revenues, % direct taxes 13.11 11.05 13.54 11.55
Observations 3,025 8,877
Centre-left government in deficit 0.409 0.492 0.384 0.486
Observations 2,911 8,745
Notes: Own calculations. We select on observations for which all measures of
corporate shares are observed.
Business Demography data includes activities relating to industry, construc-
tion, distributive trades and services aggregated at the 2-digit NACE indus-
12The table reveals substantial heterogeneity in corporate shares across countries. Our
results however remain robust to alternative sample definitions.
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try level. The industry classification was changed from NACE 1.1 to NACE
2 codes in 2008. We match data across the two classifications as reported in
table A5, resulting into 48 2-digit industries which can be aggregated into 12
1-digit industries.13 We include a dummy in the main regression to account
for the break in the series. In addition, we create additional country-specific
dummies to account for breaks in corporate shares data.14
Our main independent variable is the tax differential between personal and
corporate tax bases. We follow the literature and use top statutory income
tax rates taken from the European Commission. However, the decision to
incorporate will mostly affect small and medium sized firms, which can of-
ten make use of reduced corporate tax rates in countries with a progressive
system. Thus, we replace the top statutory corporate tax rate with the com-
bined targeted corporate rates collected from the OECD whenever available.
The use of statutory rates is based on the following reasons. First, as the
choice over the legal from is discrete, we are interested in average effective tax
rates rather than marginal ones. As argued by Mackie-Mason and Gordon
(1997), top statutory rates are expected to strongly correlate with effective
personal tax rates, even though non-corporate entrepreneurs may face dif-
ferent personal income rates. Similarly, although there may be provisions
for lower corporate tax rates depending on firms profits, changes in effective
tax rates should be mostly related to changes in top statutory corporate tax
rates.15 Second, Devereux and Griffith (2003) showed that as profitability of
firms increases, average effective tax rates approach statutory tax rates.
13The reclassification is based on the NACE 1.1 codes and broadly follows that used by
Bergner and Heckemeyer (2017).
14Business Demography data is mostly based on firm-level or administrative sources
aggregated by the National Statistical Institutes. Since data quality has improved over
time, some sources have been changed and methodologies updated, breaks are present in
the data, as reported in table A4. A set of country-specific dummies equal to one starting
from the break year is included in all regression equations.
15The European Commission provides data on effective average tax rates between 2007
and 2016. The correlation between this indicator and the statutory corporate tax rate is
0.9364, in line with what claimed by Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997). Figure A2 in the
appendix shows that the two measures are co-moving.
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Given our main dependent and independent variables, we make the following
sample choices. We drop Estonia and Malta due to poor data quality.16 In
addition, we exclude countries for which we do not have data for six con-
secutive years or more, namely Croatia, Greece, Switzerland, Romania and
Bulgaria.17 Observations before 2000 are also dropped as data is only avail-
able for Finland and the United Kingdom. Finally, to ensure comparability
of results across specifications, we select on observations for which all types
of corporate shares measures are available. Countries covered are listed in
table A3 in the appendix.
Regarding control variables, annual data on real output in chain-linked vol-
umes is taken from Eurostat. The World Bank EDB database provides an
overall indicator on the ease of starting a business, which contains informa-
tion regarding the time, costs, number of procedures and minimum capital
(in percent of income per capita) necessary to start a business for a small-to
medium-size limited liability company. Thus, the indicator is expected to
reflect non-tax costs and benefits of incorporation. As annual data is avail-
able from 2003, we assume the measure to be constant and equal to the last
available values whenever data is missing.18
In the robustness section, we replace the EDB indicator with the overall
indicator for economic freedom provided by the Heritage Foundation and
available from 2000. Moreover, we instrument the tax differential with the de
facto KOF Globalization Index developed by Gygli et al. (2018). In principle,
a more globalized economy implies intensified international competition for
capital and therefore could lead to lower corporate tax rates relatively to
the personal tax rates. In addition, we use a dummy equal to one if the
16Estonia displays several breaks and implausible corporate shares. Malta has several
missing observations in multiple sectors in recent years and a break in the series. In both
countries, the corporate and personal tax rates are equal over the entire time span.
17Sole proprietors data is not reported until 2011 for Romania (5 consecutive years). In
Bulgaria, personal and corporate tax rates are equal over 2008-2016 (4 consecutive years).
18This assumption seems reasonable the measure is stable over time. In some countries,
we extend the indicator over the period 2000–2003 (or beyond that for countries for which
the index is not available until later years) and/or for 2016.
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government of a country is left-wing oriented and and there is a government
budget deficit and zero otherwise.19 We presume that center-left governments
faced with revenue needs will try to collect relatively more tax revenues from
corporations than right-wing governments. This in turn would reduce the
tax differential. Data on government orientation is from the World Bank
Political Indicators Database (2017) and information on the budget deficit is
taken from Eurostat.
Regarding the tax base, we measure the share of taxes paid by the self-
employed on a yearly basis starting from 2004. The Taxation Trends Report
published by the European Commission (2018b) provides information on
taxes paid by the self-employed as a percentage of total taxes and of GDP.
We use this data and information on total direct tax revenues (i.e. including
personal income taxes) to calculate the share of taxes paid by self-employed
relatively to the total tax base. That is, we take the ratio of taxes paid by the
self-employed to total direct taxes paid, multiplied by 100. As an alternative
for total direct taxes, we also use total corporate taxes.
4 Income shifting
4.1 Baseline results
We report the results obtained by estimating equation 3 in table 2 and 3.
Table 2 shows results at the 1-digit industry level. The first two columns re-
fer to the corporate share of active and new firms, whereas the last two refer
to the corporate share of employment for existing and new firms. Overall,
a higher differential between personal and corporate tax rates significantly
increases the corporate share of the economy. Specifically, a unit rise in the
tax differential increases the corporate share of active firms by 0.3 and of new
firms by 0.2 whereas it increases the corporate share of employment in active
19For more on the literature using political economy variables as instruments for taxes
see Da Rin et al. (2011) and Liu (2014).
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firms by 0.2 and in new firms by 0.1. Thus, tax differentials affect the cor-
porate share of firms more strongly than the corporate share of employment.
Small enterprises may be more likely to shift personal and corporate income
across tax bases than large (mostly incorporated) firms.20 Moreover, both for
the share of corporate firms and of corporate employment, the coefficient for
active firms is larger than that of new firms. This could reflect the fact that
most (small) firms start off as sole proprietors and consider incorporation
only at later stages.
Regarding control variables, an improvement in the ease of starting a business
indicator or higher real GDP growth significantly increases the corporate
share of the economy. In both cases, their impact on corporate shares is larger
when the latter is measured in terms of number of firms than of employed
persons. This could reflect large firms dominance in employment shares.
Table 3 reports the results obtained when using data aggregated at the 2-digit
industry level. In comparison with table 2, the effect of the tax differential
on corporate shares is somewhat smaller. On average, a unit rise in the tax
differential implies a 0.2 increase in the corporate share of active firms, and
a 0.1 increase in the share of new firms and of the employment share in
active firms. However, the tax differential does not seem to affect the share
of employment in new firms, as the coefficient is not significantly different
from zero. In comparison to table 2, the coefficient for GDP growth turns
insignificant for new firms whereas it remains significant for births.
In order to understand the policy implications of the estimated marginal ef-
fects of tables 2 and 3, we compute the semi-elasticity of the tax base. The
latter measures the percentage change in the corporate tax base following
20We focus on domestic income shifting and abstract from considerations on interna-
tional tax avoidance. This appears reasonable as according to Eurostat data in 2017 small
and medium enterprises accounted for the 99.8% of total enterprises in the European
Union (EU), and 93.1% of the total was represented by micro enterprises with zero to
nine employees. Moreover, we have replicated the analysis excluding EU tax havens (the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland and Cyprus, results available upon request).
If anything, our estimates grow larger.
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Table 2: Income shifting, 1-digit industry level
Number of firms Persons employed
Active New Active New
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax differential 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.12**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Starting a business 1.15*** 1.07*** 0.79*** 0.82***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Real GDP growth 0.42*** 0.61*** 0.29*** 0.68***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.18)
Constant -22.33*** -21.79*** 31.73*** 17.08***
(4.27) (4.80) (3.55) (5.17)
Observations 3,542 3,542 3,542 3,542
R-squared 0.55 0.42 0.59 0.33
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. Equation 3 is estimated using as dependent variable the corporate
share of the number of active firms and of new firms, and that of persons
employed in active and new firms, at the 1-digit industry level. Breaks,
industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
a 1%-point increase in the tax differential. It is obtained by dividing the
marginal coefficients for the tax differential by the average corporate shares
reported at the bottom of table A3. The resulting semi-elasticities are re-
ported in table 4. Depending on whether we consider 1-digit or 2-digits
estimates, a 1%-point increase in the tax differential results in a 0.5-0.8%
increase in the corporate share of active firms and a 0.3-0.6% increase in the
corporate share of new firms. Thus, the 4%-point increase in the average tax
differential observed between 2000 and 2016 (figure 1) implies a 1.2–3.2%
rise in the corporate share of the economy measured in terms of number of
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Table 3: Income shifting, 2-digits industry level
Number of firms Persons employed
Active New Active New
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax differential 0.22*** 0.09*** 0.14*** -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Starting a business 1.21*** 1.01*** 0.71*** 0.70***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Real GDP growth 0.09 0.36*** -0.02 0.32***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
Constant -23.22*** -11.54*** 41.29*** 31.45***
(2.78) (3.32) (1.93) (3.35)
Observations 10,607 10,607 10,607 10,607
R-squared 0.62 0.47 0.63 0.44
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. Equation 3 is estimated using as dependent variable the corporate
share of the number of active firms and of new firms, and that of persons
employed in active and new firms, at the 2-digits industry level. Breaks,
industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
firms. Semi-elasticities for employment are somewhat lower, with a 1%-point
increase in the tax differential implying an increase in the corporate share of
employment by about 0.2–0.3%.
Our results are smaller than those obtained by De Mooij and Nicodème
(2008), who find a semi-elasticity of 2.9 and 1.5 for the number of active and
new firms and of 1 for the corporate share of employment. This may be due
to several reasons. First, business demography data has been revised over
time. Second, our sample includes an additional ten years of data as well as
control variables that were not present in their baseline analysis. Third, the
15
Table 4: Semi-elasticities and elasticities of the tax base
Number of firms Persons employed
Active New Active New
semi-elasticities
1-digit 0.78 0.57 0.28 0.26
2-digits 0.53 0.25 0.18 –
elasticities
1-digit 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.05
2-digits 0.11 0.05 0.03 –
Notes: Semi-elasticities are obtained by dividing the
marginal coefficients of tables 2 and 3 by the average corpo-
rate share of table A3. Elasticities are obtained by dividing
semi-elasticities by the change in differential to which the
marginal coefficient refers to over the average tax differen-
tials reported in table 1.
sample choices we made resulted in a different set of countries and years.21
Next, we obtain elasticities by dividing semi-elasticities by the change in the
tax differential over the average tax differentials reported in table 1. This
allows comparison with other estimates and accounts for the variation in tax
gains (or costs) of incorporation. With elasticities in the range of 0.05-0.15,
our results are in line with those of Goolsbee (2004), who finds elasticities
in the range of 0.06-0.14 for the United States. Our estimates are somewhat
smaller than those of about 0.2-0.5 found by Liu (2014) and Tazhitdinova
(2016) for the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively.22
Finally, we calculate the change in the tax base. Here we follow De Mooij
21We tried to mimic De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) sample in terms of years and
countries, yet we did not find similar results (available upon request). We also noticed
that there were some discrepancies in reported statutory rates.
22See also table A1 in the appendix for a comparison with the literature.
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and Nicodème (2008) and write the change in corporate tax revenues as:









∆τcBc represents the ex-ante revenue effect from a change in the corporate
income tax rate given by the change in corporate tax rates ∆τc and the
corporate tax base Bc. ∆Bc/Bc is the semi-elasticity of the corporate tax
base. The term in brackets in the second part of the equation shows how
the ex-post revenue effect differs from the ex ante revenue effect. With a
mean corporate tax rate of 23% and a 1% reduction in corporate income tax
(∆τc = −1), the term in squared brackets will become 1− 0.18 = 0.82 for a
semi-elasticity of 0.8. Thus, an ex-ante reduction in the corporate tax rate of
1 euro will cost 82 cents in terms of lost corporate tax revenues (whereas 18
cents are gained through income shifting from the personal to the corporate
tax base). However, corporate tax revenue gains come at the expense of
the personal income tax revenue as long as τp > τc. For semi-elasticities
in the range of 0.2-0.6, a corporate tax rate costing one euro of corporate
tax revenue will cost 95-86 cents whereas the gain in income shifting from
personal to corporate tax rates will be of 5-14 cents.
4.2 Robustness
We conduct several robustness checks. We focus thereby on the corporate
share of active firms, as this variable may better track the behaviour of small
business owners in response to income shifting incentives. As in the previous
section, we check the strength of the results both at the 1-digit and at 2-digits
industry level. Table 5 presents 1-digit results and table A6 in the appendix
shows 2-digits estimates.
First, we calculate alternative measures of the corporate share by including
partnerships to either the denominator in column 1 or both the numerator
and the denominator of the ratio in column 2, as in De Mooij and Nicodème
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(2008). Considering partnerships as non-corporate (column 1) reduces the
effect of the tax differential whereas considering them as corporate (column
2) increases the effect of the tax differential on incorporation decision. This
could be interpreted as evidence that the majority of partnerships are subject
to corporate tax treatment. At the 2-digit industry level (table A6), the tax
differential has a slightly smaller impact for both measures.
Next, we replace the tax differential with both the personal and corporate
top statutory tax rate. Column 3 of table 5 and A6 shows that a higher per-
sonal income tax rate significantly increases incorporation whereas a higher
corporate income tax rate discourages it. The size of the effect is larger for
the corporate income tax rate than for the personal one.
In addition, we replace the EDB indicator with the overall index of economic
freedom. The latter is a broader proxy for the extent of pro-business policy
that could capture even more country specific characteristics. It is also avail-
able over the entire time period of the analysis. If anything, the estimate for
the tax differential in column 4 becomes larger when using economic freedom,
both at the 1- and the 2-digits industry level.23
Moreover, as firms may take time to change their organizational forms in
response to changes in tax rates due to transaction costs, we replace the tax
differential with its own lag, as reported in column 5. Both at the 1- and
2-digits level, the coefficient estimate for the lagged tax differential remains
positive and significant, and closely resembles baseline results. Column 6
reports the results obtained when using the lead of the tax differential, which
results in similar patterns as observed for the lag.24
23Moreover, restricting the time period of the analysis to the availability of the EDB
indicator leads to larger coefficients estimates. Results available upon request.
24In addition, we included expectations about future business developments proxied by
Eurostat (first quarter average of) confidence indicators for industry, construction, retail
and services. The tax differential coefficient remained positive and significant. Results
available upon request as the indicators are not available for Iceland and Norway and
therefore refer to a reduced sample.
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Table 5: Robustness checks for the number of active firms, 1-digit level
Partnerships Partnerships Separate Economic
Lag Lead
non-corporate corporate tax rates freedom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax differential 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.42***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Personal tax rate 0.28***
(0.04)
Corporate tax rate -0.50***
(0.06)
Starting a business 1.01*** 1.14*** 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.12***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Real GDP growth 0.52*** 0.10 0.31** 0.11 0.48*** 0.47***







Constant -21.51*** -15.75*** -15.61*** -44.69*** -19.70*** -18.83***
(4.18) (3.99) (4.63) (5.63) (4.45) (4.43)
Observations 3,542 3,542 3,542 3,542 3,344 3,333
R-squared 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Equation 3
is estimated at the 1-digit level using the corporate share of active firms including partnerships as
non-corporate in column 1 and as corporate in column 2, including the statutory tax rates instead of
the differential in column 3 and using the index of economic freedom instead of the EDB indicator
in column 4. Column 5 and 6 include in the regression one lag and one lead of the tax differential,
respectively. Breaks, industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
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Finally, we have tested the endogeneity of the tax differential on income
shifting by using instrumental variables. If countries increase the corporate
tax rate or reduce the personal tax in response to expanding corporate shares
in the economy, the error term of the regression would be correlated with our
main independent variable. This in turn would result in biased estimates of
the effect of the tax differential on incorporation.




KOF globalization indicator 0.51***
(0.03)
Government is centre-left and in deficit -1.86***
(0.37)
Starting a business 0.08*** 0.32***
(0.02) (0.02)
Real GDP growth -0.06 -0.22*** -0.47***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 2.19 -17.11*** -5.29*
(1.72) (2.60) (2.79)
Observations 3,344 3,542 2,911
R-squared 0.66 0.45 0.46
F-statistic 380.23 1415.58 803.28
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Instrument t-value 35.96 15.13 -5.06
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. Results are obtained by regressing the tax differential on the
instruments (one lag of the tax differential, globalization indicator and
center-left government in deficit) at the 1-digit industry level. Break, in-
dustry and year dummies are included in the regression but not reported.
First, we instrument the tax differential with its own lag. Next, we use a
20
globalization indicator, as we expect that more globalized countries would
be most affected by international tax competition and levy lower corporate
taxes. As this indicator is likely to pick up similar variation as the EDB
indicator, we do not include the latter in the instrumented equations to avoid
multicollinearity. Finally, we use a measure for whether the government has
centre-left orientation and has a budget deficit. In comparison to a right-
wing government, a centre-left government faced with revenue needs seems
more likely to raise corporate taxes.
The relevance of the instruments and the direction of the relationship be-
tween instruments and tax differential are tested in the first-stage regressions
of table 6. Instruments are statistically significant in explaining the tax dif-
ferential and display the expected sign. Globalization and lagged differential
significantly increase the tax differential whereas a center-left government in
deficit is associated, on average, with lower tax differentials. T-tests and F-
tests for the first stage regression are large.25 For the government indicator
and the lagged differential, however, there are less observations available.
The results obtained when using instrumental variables estimation for the
corporate share of active firms and of persons employed in active firms at
the 1-digit industry level are reported in table 7. Estimates show that the
impact of the tax differential on incorporation is positive and significant. The
results obtained when instrumenting the tax differential with its own lag are
larger than in the baseline, yet close to OLS estimates. This holds also
when using the globalization index as an instrument, both when corporate
shares are measured in terms of number of firms and in terms of employed
persons. Finally, when using the government indicator, coefficients increase
substantially in size.
25As a rule of thumb to avoid selecting weak instruments, the literature suggests that,
for a single endogenous regressor, the F-statistic of a joint test for whether all excluded
instruments are significantly different from zero should exceed 10. In presence of a single
instrument and a single endogenous regressor, this suggests that the t-value for the instru-
ment should be larger than
√
10 ≈ 3.2. Alternatively, the corresponding p-value should
be below 0.0016. This holds for all our instruments.
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Table 7: IV results, corporate share of active firms, 1-digit industry level
1 lag Globalization Government
Firms Employed Firms Employed Firms Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax differential 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.36** 0.65*** 1.67*** 0.67*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.12) (0.52) (0.36)
Starting a business 1.09*** 0.76*** 0.64*** 0.67***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.19) (0.14)
Real GDP growth 0.51*** 0.35*** -0.06 0.16 1.13*** 0.68***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.32) (0.22)
Constant -20.68*** 32.45*** 65.89*** 84.98*** -11.40 30.90***
(4.46) (3.69) (4.88) (3.46) (8.81) (5.57)
Observations 3,344 3,344 3,542 3,542 2,911 2,911
R-squared 0.54 0.59 0.46 0.53 0.33 0.55
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Results
are obtained by estimating equation 3 and instrumenting the tax differential with its own
lag, the globalization index and the center-left government in deficit. Break, industry and
year dummies are included in the regression but not reported.
Overall, coefficients obtained using IV are larger than OLS estimates, with
semi-elasticities for the number of active firms ranging between 0.7–1.2 and
those for employment in active firms ranging between 0.2–0.8. This confirms
what pointed out by Liu (2014), i.e. that if taxes are endogenous because
they change in response to expanding tax bases, OLS estimates are biased
towards zero. Therefore, our baseline results can be interpreted as a lower
bound to the impact of tax differentials on corporate activity.
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5 Tax base effects
5.1 Baseline results
Table 8: Tax base effects
1-digit 2-digits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate share of active firms -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.27*** -0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Starting a business -0.37*** -0.38***
(0.04) (0.02)
Real GDP growth -0.34*** -0.30***
(0.07) (0.04)
Constant 35.76*** 62.61*** 39.85*** 67.00***
(1.33) (3.18) (0.97) (1.83)
Observations 3,026 3,026 8,877 8,877
R-squared 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.65
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Results are obtained by estimating equation 4 at the 1-digit and 2-digit level, with
and without control variables. Break, year and industry dummies are included but
not reported. We select on observations for which all measures of corporate shares are
available.
Income shifting induced by the tax differential increases the corporate income
tax base and erodes the personal income tax base. Thus, given the findings
on income shifting and corporate tax base effects, we expect the amount of
taxes paid by self-employed entrepreneurs to respond to changes in corporate
shares. Table 8 reports the results obtained when estimating equation 4 using
data over 2004-2016. An increase in the corporate share of the number of
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active firms in the economy results in lower tax revenue paid by the self-
employed. Specifically, a unit increase in the corporate share of active firms
in the economy reduces the share of revenue paid by the self employed in
total capital revenue by 0.2-0.3. The inclusion of controls somewhat reduces
the magnitude of the estimates and coefficients size is larger at the 2-digit
industry level. Transforming coefficients estimates into semi-elasticities of the
personal tax base for the self-employed we obtain estimates between -0.9 and
-1.4. Given that we are interested in the effect of a change of about 0.8% in
the corporate share resulting from a 1%-point increase in the tax differential,
we compute the elasticity of the tax base of −0.9/(1/0.4) = −0.4. This in
turn corresponds to an approximate 0.3% decrease in the tax base for a 0.8%
increase in the corporate share of the economy.
5.2 Robustness
We check the robustness of the effect of the share of active corporate firms
on the tax base at the 1-digit industry level in table 9 and at the and 2-
digits industry level in table A7 in the appendix. In column 1, we use an
alternative definition of the tax base, measured as the ratio of direct tax
revenues paid by the self-employed as a percentage of GDP. The estimated
effect of the corporate share of active firms on the tax base is somewhat
lower compared to baseline. This is in line with the summary statistics
reported in table 1. Next, we test the strength of the results to the inclusion
of alternative measures of the main independent variable. Specifically, we
include the corporate share of new firms in column 2, and the corporate
share of employed persons in existing and new firms respectively in column
3 and 4. Although slightly reduced, estimates remain significant.
Overall, these results provide direct evidence of an erosion of the personal tax
base in response to a larger corporate share of the economy. In light of the
income shifting estimates provided above, these results can be interpreted
as additional evidence of behavioral responses of entrepreneurs to differential
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Table 9: Robustness of tax base effects, 1-digit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate share, number of active firms -0.14***
(0.01)
Corporate share, number of new firms -0.16***
(0.01)
Corporate share, employed in active firms -0.14***
(0.01)
Corporate share, employed in new firms -0.10***
(0.01)
Starting a business -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.49*** -0.50***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Real GDP growth -0.05 -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.31***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 66.26*** 62.75*** 73.28*** 68.65***
(3.59) (3.16) (3.36) (3.34)
Observations 3,026 3,026 3,026 3,026
R-squared 0.46 0.61 0.57 0.58
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Results
are obtained by estimating equation 4 at the 1-digit and 2-digits industry level, with and
without control variables. The first four column use an alternative measure of the dependent
variable, with and without controls. The last two columns of the panel report the results
obtained when using the corporate share of new firms instead of that of active firms as main
dependent variable. Break, year and industry dummies are included in the regression but not
reported in the table.
personal and corporate income taxes via legal form choice. Besides, they shed




We investigate the effect of increasing tax differential between personal and
corporate tax rates in Europe on income shifting. We find that differential
taxation results in higher corporate shares in the economy. This is in line
with behavioral responses of small entrepreneur who self-select into corporate
organizational forms in order to be able to shift income across tax bases.
Specifically, we find that a 1%-point increase in the tax differential results in
a 0.3-0.8% increase in the corporate share of firms and a 0.2-0.3% increase in
the corporate share of employment. Our estimates are robust to alternative
specifications and to the use of an alternative IV estimator, and can overall be
considered as a lower bound to income shifting effects. This revises existing
estimates.
In addition, we find that a larger corporate share of the economy implies
a decrease in tax revenue paid by the self-employed. Specifically, a 0.8%
increase in the corporate share of active firms resulting from a 1%-point
increase in the tax differential would correspond to approximately a 0.3%
decrease in the personal tax revenues collected from the self-employed. This
is consistent with income shifting, as when entrepreneurs incorporate they
reclassify part of their personal income as corporate income to pay the lower
corporate tax rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first available





Figure A1: Direct income taxes in the European Union, percent of total taxes
Source: European Commission. Notes: The figure plots the average direct corporate and
personal income taxes in percentage of total taxes for 28 European Union countries.
Figure A2: Top statutory corporate income tax rates vs average effective tax
rates, percent
Source: European Commission. Notes: The figure plots the average direct corporate and
personal income taxes in percentage of total taxes for 28 European Union countries.
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Table A1: Comparison with the literature
Author Corporate Coefficient Average Differential Average Semi- Elasticity
share estimate corporate share change differential elasticity
Goolsbee (2004)
firms 0.245 0.626 0.1 0.035 0.39 0.14
establishments 0.192 0.698 0.1 0.035 0.27 0.10
employment 0.146 0.860 0.1 0.035 0.17 0.06
De Mooij and
active firms 0.102 0.357 0.1 0.170 0.29 0.49
Nicodeme (2008)
new firms 0.055 0.368 0.1 0.170 0.15 0.26
employed in active firms 0.082 0.818 0.1 0.170 0.10 0.17
employed in new firms 0.060 0.586 0.1 0.170 0.10 0.17
Liu (2014)
establishments 0.288 0.344 0.1 0.064 0.84 0.54
employment 0.343 0.852 0.1 0.064 0.40 0.26
production 0.309 0.879 0.1 0.064 0.35 0.22
Notes: Calculations based on results reported in the papers. Semi-elasticities are derived by dividing the marginal coeffcients by the average
corporate share. Elasticties by dividing the latter by the tax differential change to which the marginal coefficient refers to divided by the
average tax differential.
Table A4: Break dummies
Break Year Description
NACE 2008 Reclassification from NACE rev. 1.1 sectoral codes to NACE rev. 2
Austria 2007 Change in threshold (all firms with turnover and or at least one employee included)
Belgium 2009 Inclusion of natural persons that do not have employment and are not VAT registered
Denmark 2008 Small break in employment data
Denmark 2013 Change of unit of employment to headcount
Spain 2002 Unit of employment changed to FTE
Finland 2003 Unit of employment changed to headcount
Finland 2013 Business register data integrated with microdata
France 2009 New enterpise status implemented resulting in a higher number of births
France 2013 Harmonization of employment variables
Ireland 2014 Break not reported in country notes but reported in the data and significant
Italy 2011 Changes in methodology to estimate status of activity and employment
Lithuania 2004 Inclusion of natural persons in the data
Lithuania 2005 Inclusion of natural persons operating without patent in the data
Latvia 2002 Inclusion of natural persons with activities related to patents and farms in the data
Latvia 2004 Access to all individual data may have improved accuracy (no duplication)
Netherlands 2006 New business register that should have gradually decreased coupling loss
Netherlands 2013 Redesign of production system
Netherlands 2010 Change of threshold methodology to define active enterprise (increase in population)
Norway 2001 Methodological changes
Portugal 2008 Break not reported in country notes but reported in the data and significant
Sweden 2011 Inclusion of additional enterprises with postal address outside sweden included
Slovenia 2002 Inclusion of more natural persons
Notes: The table reports the break dummies included in the regression equations of the anal-
ysis. The year reported is the first year in which the dummy equals one.
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Table A2: Variables definition
Variable Definition Source
Corporate shares of firms Number of limited liability firms (active or
new) divided by the sum of the number of lim-
ited liability (active or new) firms and sole pro-




Corporate shares of persons em-
ployed
Number of persons employed in limited liability
firms (active or new) divided by the sum of the
number of persons employed in limited liability
(active or new) firms and in sole proprietorship
firms (active or new) and multiplied by 100.
Eurostat Business De-
mography
Tax differential Difference between the top personal statutory




Corporate tax rate Top statutory corporate income tax rate (in %),
replaced by reduced rates or targeted tax rates
(in %) in countries where it is available.
European Commission
and OECD
Top statutory corporate tax rate % European Commission
Top statutory personal tax rate % European Commission
Reduced/targeted tax rates % OECD
Real GDP growth Gross domestic product at mmarket prices,
real, % change over previous period
Eurostat
Starting a business Measure distance to frontier for the ease of
starting a business. Based on information re-
garding the time (days), cost, number of pro-
cedures and minimum capital (in percent of
income per capita) necessary to start a busi-
ness for a small-to medium-size limited liabil-
ity company in each economy’s largest business
city.
World Bank
Economic freedom Based on 12 quantitative and qualitative fac-
tors pertaining to rule of law, government
size, regulatory efficiency and market openness
graded on a scale of 0 to 100.
Heritage Foundation
KOF (de facto) globalization index Index scaled from 0 to 100 comprising eco-




Centre-left government Party orientation with respect to economic pol-
icy, 1 if centre-left and zero otherwise. Indica-
tor based on variable EXECRLC
World Bank database
of political institutions
Government deficit Net lending or borrowing, % of GDP Eurostat
Self-employed tax revenues, % of
capital taxes
Tax revenues paid by the self employed as a
percent of total capital tax revenues
European Commission
Self-employed tax revenues, % of
direct taxes
Tax revenues paid by the self employed as a
percent of total direct tax revenues
European Commission
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Table A3: Country specific average corporate shares
Number of firms Persons employed
Active New Active New
Austria 18.84 14.75 68.16 27.71
Belgium 60.11 52.91 88.33 59.89
Cyprus 52.93 49.96 84.97 67.46
Czech Republic 17.56 16.34 70.96 28.98
Germany 21.38 14.64 72.40 20.34
Denmark 45.47 39.28 85.50 38.35
Spain 38.06 29.06 75.99 43.81
Finland 44.97 31.06 91.82 52.75
France 43.74 38.15 75.09 49.67
United Kingdom 70.88 74.43 92.66 79.70
Hungary 38.14 37.70 77.10 55.25
Ireland 47.66 45.64 83.11 41.28
Iceland 63.81 52.22 93.21 56.92
Italy 19.51 19.02 65.77 30.08
Lithuania 35.68 20.26 83.02 49.31
Luxembourg 73.87 75.06 90.54 76.75
Latvia 64.87 54.47 93.17 74.34
Netherlands 25.52 14.85 83.76 37.37
Norway 47.57 33.37 89.72 53.60
Poland 6.81 6.53 51.72 19.43
Portugal 30.43 25.12 75.63 40.12
Sweden 47.63 34.76 87.31 43.26
Slovenia 35.79 27.78 78.09 37.73
Slovakia 27.15 28.12 68.99 38.67
Average 40.77 34.81 80.29 46.78
Notes: Own calculations obtained averages across 1-
digit sectors and time for each country. We select on
observations for which all measures of corporate shares
are observed.
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Table A5: Reclassification of NACE activities
ID NACE 1.1 NACE 2 DESCRIPTION
A00 C B Mining and quarrying
B00 D C Manufacturing
B01 DA C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages, and to-
bacco
B02 DB C13_C14 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, and other
textile products
B03 DC C15 Manufacture of leather and leather products
B04 DD C16 Manufacture of wood, wood and cork products (ex-
cept furniture), articles of straw, and plating mate-
rials
B05 DE C17_C18, J58 Manufacture of pulp, paper, and paper products;
publishing and printing
B06 DF C19 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products,
and nuclear fuel
B07 DG C20_C21 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products, man-
made fibres, basic pharmaceutical products, and
pharmaceutical preparations
B08 DH C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
B09 DI C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
B10 DJ C24_C25 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal
products except machinery and equipment
B11 DK C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
B12 DL C26_C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment, computer prod-
ucts, electronic products, and optical products
B13 DM C29_C30 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers,
and other transport equipment
B14 DN C31_C32 Manufacture of furniture and other manufacturing
B15 C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
C00 E Electricity, gas, water supply
C01 E40 D Electricity, gas steam, air conditioning, and hot wa-
ter supply
C02 E41,O90 E Water supply, sewerage, waste management, and re-
mediation activities
D00 F F Construction
E00 G G Wholesale and retail trade
E01 G50 G45 Wholesale trade, retail trade, and repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles
E02 G51 G46 Wholesale trade and commission trade except of mo-
tor vehicles and motorcycles
E03 G52 G47, S95 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcy-
cles; repair of personal and household goods
F00 H I Hotels and restaurants
F01 H551_H552 I55 Hotels, camping sites, and other provisions of short-
stay accommodation
F02 H553-H555 I56 Food and beverage service activities
This table illustrates the classification structure used to match NACE 1.1. to NACE 2 data following the
change in 2008. We broadly follow the reclassification used by Bergner and Heckemeyer (2017), although with
some minor changes.
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Table A5: Reclassification of NACE activities (ctd.)
ID NACE 1.1 NACE 2 DESCRIPTION
G00 I H Transport, storage and communications
G01 I60 H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
G02 I61 H50 Water transport
G03 I62 H51 Air transport
G04 I63 H52, N79 Warehousing and support activities for transporta-
tion; travel agency, tour operator, and other reserva-
tion service and related activities
G05 I64 H53, J61 Postal and courier activities; telecommunications
H00 K N Real estate and business activities
H01 K70, K71 N77 Rental and leasing activities
H02 K72 J62 Computer programming, consultancy, and related
activities
H03 K73 M72 Scientific research and development
H04 K7411, K7412 M69 Legal, accounting, book-keeping, and auditing activ-
ities; tax consultancy
H05 K7414 M70 Activities of head offices and management consul-
tancy activities
H06 K742, K743 M71 Architectural activities, engineering activities, re-
lated technical consultancy, technical testing, and
technical analysis
H07 K7413, K744 M73 Advertising, market research, and public opinion
polling
H08 K745 N78 Employment activities
H09 K746 N80 Security and investigation service
H10 K747 N81 Services to buildings and landscape activities
H11 K748 M74, N82 Other professional, scientific, and technical activi-
ties; office administrative, office support, and other
business support activities
I00 M P Education
L00 N S Health and social work
L01 M75 Veterinary activities
L02 Q Human health and social work activities
M00 O M Others
M01 O91 S94 Activities of membership organizations
M02 O92 J59-60, J63, R90-93, R96 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
M03 O93 S96 Other personal service activities
N00 K K Finance and insurance
N01 J66 K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except
compulsory social security
N02 J67 K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insur-
ance activities
Table A6: Robustness checks for the number of active firms, 2-digits level
Partnerships Partnerships Separate Economic
Lag Lead
non-corporate corporate tax rates freedom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax differential 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.35***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Personal tax rate 0.12***
(0.02)
Corporate tax rate -0.72***
(0.03)
Starting a business 1.06*** 1.19*** 1.20*** 1.18*** 1.19***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP growth 0.31*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.18** 0.14* 0.12







Constant -23.03*** -15.47*** -4.95* -30.88*** -20.10*** -21.22***
(2.78) (2.53) (2.96) (3.60) (2.91) (2.92)
Observations 10,607 10,607 10,607 10,607 9,987 9,979
R-squared 0.58 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.61
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Equation 3
is estimated at the 2-digits level using the corporate share of active firms including partnerships as
non-corporate in column 1 and as corporate in column 2, including the statutory tax rates instead
of the differential in column 3 and using the index of economic freedom instead of the EDB indicator
in column 4. Column 5 and 6 include in the regression one lag and one lead of the tax differential,
respectively. Breaks, industry and year dummies are included but not reported.
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Table A7: Robustness of tax base effects, 2-digits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate share, number of active firms -0.19***
(0.01)
Corporate share, number of new firms -0.18***
(0.00)
Corporate share, employed in active firms -0.20***
(0.01)
Corporate share, employed in new firms -0.15***
(0.00)
Starting a business -0.55*** -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.53***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Real GDP growth 0.05 -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.22***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 71.05*** 69.17*** 82.25*** 75.48***
(2.04) (1.87) (1.95) (1.93)
Observations 8,877 8,877 8,877 8,877
R-squared 0.52 0.65 0.62 0.64
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Results
are obtained by estimating equation 4 at the 1-digit and 2-digit level, with and without control
variables. The first four column use an alternative measure of the dependent variable, with and
without controls. The last two columns of the panel report the results obtained when using
the corporate share of new firms instead of that of active firms as main dependent variable.
Break, year and industry dummies are included in the regression but not reported in the table.
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